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any of the states. This court is of the opinion that the ordinance
is not authorized by the Act of the Legislature. The United
States attorney for the district of Kentucky, the commonwealth's
attorney for this judicial district, and the attorney for the city of
Louisville, all are lawyers practising law for fee and reward in the
city, and are included in said ordinances, and for failure to obtain
such license, are liable to fine and imprisonment for exercising the
functions of their respective offices. To enforce this ordinance
will clog the wheels of justice.
In the opinion of this court, both the Act of the Legislature and
city ordinance are against 'the spirit of our institutions, and are
unconstitutional, the enforoement of which would produce irre-
parable injury. Both the Legislature and General Council should
review their action.
The warrant is dismissed.
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ACTION. See Assignment; Broker.
Under particular circumstances, a creditor of the estate of a deceased
person may maintain an action to collect his debt from a debtor to the
estate : Fisher ct al. v. -ubbell et al., 65 Barb.
Distinction between Trespass and Aceout.-A bill of particulars read.
ing as follows:
"I. B. to L. T. S., to timber taken and received from the S. W. 8.
*"t. 12, R. 22 :-
400 cross ties of the value of 50 cts. each $200 00
3 sets of switch ties at the value of ...... 100 00
$300 00",
discloses an action on an account and not one for trespass on real es.
tate : Bernstine v. Sithi, 10 Kans.
I From W. C. Webb, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 10 Ka. . Reports.
2 From J. Shaaff Stockett, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in :37 Md. Reports.
I 'rom Ilon. 0. L. Barbour; to appear in vol. 65 of his v port .
I From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 71 'a. Si. Repoits.
6 From J. W. Rowell, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 45 Vt. Reports.
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ASSIGNMENT.
Right of Assignee to sue in his own Name.-A claim for money tor.
tinusly obtained from tne claimant, may be assigned to a third person,
Fn as to give the assignee a right to recover the same in his own name:
Stewart v. Balderson, 10 Kans.
AsSUMPSIT.
Services in expectation of Legac-Action for.-Contracts with
nurses, housekeepers, &c., sought to be enforced after the death of tht
person to whom the services were rendered, ought to be very closely
scanned, and juries instructed that they could be made out only by very
clear proof. The correction of verdicts not founded on such proof, or
unreasonable in amount, is confided to the sound legal discretion of the
court below, but such contract must possess the element of certainty.
Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Penn.
The promise to the plaintiff was, "If she would stay with him as
long as he lived, he would provide and give her full and plenty after he
was gone, so that she need not work." This was sufficiently certain
and definite: Id.
The measure of amount would be what would keep her without work,
taking into consideration her condition in life : Id.
Where services are gratuitously rendered under expectation of a leg-
acy, there,can be no contract and therefore no recovery for the services;
but where one does services on request, no matter what his expectations
were, there may be a recovery for them : Id.
ATTORNEY.
Authority implied by Law.-As a general rule, an attorney employed
as such in a cause, has not thereby the incidental power to pledge the
credit of his client by employing another attorney as an assistant. But,
where the facts in a particular case are such that it may fairly be in-
ferred from them that such authority was given, this general rule would
yield: Willard v. Danville, 45 Vt.
Where the agent of a town for prosecuting and defending suits was not
present at the trial of a suit against the town, but was at his home in a
town adjoining the place of trial, and had done nothing about the suit,
except consult once with the attorney for the town, to determine upon
the necessary preparation for defence, and procure the attendance of the
necessary witnesses at the trial. in other respects the care and responsi-
bility of the trial being left with said attorney, who resided at the place
of trial, nothing appearing to indicate that said agent might not have
been seasonably consulted on the subject of employing assistant counsel,
nor that anything transpired, or came to light, rendering counsel neces-
sary, which was not known to said attorney and agent at the time of such
consultation, it was held, that said attorney had not therefore authority
implied by law to bind the town by the employment of assistant counsel
in the case: Id.
BANKRUPTCY.
Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States-Attachment 'under
State Laws.-The property of a bankrupt in the hands of his assignee,
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duly appointed under the Bankrupt Law of the United States, is not
liable, at the instance of a creditor of the bankrupt, to attachment under
the laws of a state. Newman v. Fisher, 37 Md.
Under the Act of Congress, entitled "An Act to establish a uniform
system of bankruptcy throughout the United States," approved March
2d 1867, the District Courts of the United States have original, supe-
rior and exclusive jurisdiction over a bankrupt, his estate, and all qdes-
tions connected therewith, from the time proceedings in bankruptcy are
begun until the final distribution and settlement of the bankrupt es-
tate : Id.
BROKER.
Carrging Stock-Rights of Parties-Evidefice.-Esser employel
brokers to buy stock and "carry it." The brokers wrote him for further
security, or they would not carry his stock. The stock remained with
them unsold till it was worthless. In a suit by the brokers for the
money advanced by them; his defence being that they should have sold
the stock, he could not testify that he believed from the letter that they
would sell without further orders from him: .Esser v. Linderman,
71 Penn.
What the letter meant was a question of law for the court: Id.
If the brokers had sold the stock without giving further notice and
it had risen, they would have been responsible: Id.
Having proved that they had purchased 'the stock, it was not neces-
sary for the brokers to produce the certificate at the trial : Id.
When one purchases a chattel for another, he may sue for the money
without a tender of the thing: the delivery of the thing cannot be de-
manded until the money is paid or tendered: Id.
Dealings between-Disclosure of Principal- Custom.-Waln employed
Markoe, a broker in Philadelphia, to sell stock; Evans, a broker in New
York, sold the stock by order of Wister, another Philadelphia broker
under Markoe, with assent of Waln, without naming the owner; before
the proceeds were remitted by Evans, Wister failed, in debt to Evans.
Held, that Evans could not retain the debt from the proceeds : Evans v.
Waln, 71 Penn.
After Wister's failure Evans asked Markoe to send certificates and
he would remit to Markoe less Wister's debt: Markoe answered, the
stock was a customer's; Evans answered, send stock in any event,
"will give you net balance to-morrow." Markoe sent the stock. lIeld,
that " net balance" meant proceeds after deducting expenses of sale : Id.
Evidence that it was the custom of brokers, in their dealings with
brokers of other cities, to put all transactions between them into one
account and settle for the general balance, was inadmissible : Id.
Such custom would not have authorized defendants to credit Wister's
account with the proceeds of the stock : Id,
The action for the amount retained by Evans, was properly brought
in the name of Wain : Id.
An action for the proceeds of property sold by one agent by orders
of another can be maintained by the owner against seller: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Municipal Corporations-Interference by Legislature with their v(.,ted
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Riglts.-Between private citizens and counties, incorporated towns or
cities of the state, there is a wide and substantial distinction with
respect to vested rights protected from legislative power. Such public
bodies are public corporations created by the Legislature for political
purposes, with political powers to be exercised for purposes connected
with the public good in the administration of civil government. They
are instruments of government subject at all times to the control of the
Legislature with respect to their duration, powers, rights and property.
It is of the essence of such a corporation that the government has the
sole right as trustee of the public interest, at its own good will and
pleasure, to inspect, regulate, control and direct the corporation, its funds
and franchises: Mayor, &c., v. Sehner, 37 Md.
DEED. See Equity.
An escrow signed, sealed and deposited upon a valuable consideration,
is not recoverable by the depositor, except according to the terms of
the agreement and deposit: Stanton et al. v. MAiller et al., 65 Barb.
The depositary of an escrow, under such circumstances, is as much
the agent of the grantee as of the grantor ; and he is as much bound
to deliver the deed, on performance of the condition, as he is to with-
hold it until performance: Id.
Although it may be doubtful whether the deed can take effect without
actual delivery, yet when it is delivered, the delivery relates back to the
time of the deposit: Id.
EQuITY. See Injunction; International Law.
Specific Performance.-The specific performance of an agreement for
the conveyance of land, in consideration of support and maintenance
during life, may be compelled in equity: Stanton et al. v. .Miller et al.,
65 Barb.
T& compel Delivery of Deeds.-To compel the delivery of deeds and
other instruments, in favor of persons legally entitled to them, is an old
head of equity jurisdiction, is a most important branch of that jurisdic-
tion, and is exerted in all suitable cases, in favor of persons entitled to
the possession of deeds or other instruments : Id.
And a case where a deed has been delivered in escrow, upon a condi-
tion which has been fulfilled, would seem to be one which especially jus-
tifies and calls for the exercise of this jurisdiction ; since the uithhold-
ing of the deed interferes with, and -probably prevents, the vesting of
the legal title: Id.
Where the contingency upon which a deed in escrow was to be de-
livered, viz., the death of the grantor, had happened, and the grantees
had fully performed the contract on their part; Held, that the arrange-
ment created an equitable interest in the property conveyed, which
ripened into an absolute equitable (if not legal) title, on the death of
the grantor ; and that the grantees were entitled to a delivery, and the
custody of the deed, and to have the same recovered : Id.
Right of a Vendor to obtain Specific Performance of a Contract, a-
thtough unable to convey to the Vendee to the full extent bargainedor-
Application for the Rescission of a Contract to be made without delzy
-Where a vendor is unable from any cause, not involving mala fides on
his part, to convey each and every parcel of the land contractcd to be
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sold, and it is apparent that the part that cannot be conveyed is of small
importance, or is immaterial to the purchaser's enjoyment of that which
may be conveyed to him, in such case tlhe vendor may insist on per-
formance with compensation to the purchaser, or a proportionate abate-
ment from the agreed price, if that has not been paid. This, however,
cannot be done where the part in reference to which the defect exists is
a considerable portion of the entire subject-matter, or is in its nature
material to the enjoyment of that part about which there is no defect:
Foley v. Crow, 37 Md.
ERROR.
Insffic iency of Record.-Where the record shows that only a portion
of the evidence is preserved and fails to show that it contains all the
instructions, this court is unable to say that an instruction which was
given was inapplicable or erroneous, or was not so far modified by other
instructions that if erroneous it has wrought no prejudice to the party
complaining: Gallobeo v. Mitchell, 10 Kans.
.Natters of Discretion- Withdrawal of Juror.-On a trial an attor-
ney, in discussing a question of evidence, stated in the hearing of the
jury matters not evidence; the court refused the motion of the other
side to withdraw a juror. feld, to be in the discretion of the court
below, and not reviewable on error: Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Penn.
EVIDENCE.
Records of Patent-Proof of Loss.-Tle record in the office of the
register of deeds of a patent is admissible in evidence without proof
that the original is lost, or destroyed, or not under the control of the
party desiring to use it: Bernstine v. Smith, 10 Kans.
itsband and If fe.-In an action in the name of husband and wife
to recover for personal injuries to the wife, the defendant introduced
testimony to prove that the husband, soon after the injury, in the pres-
ence of his wife, told the witness that the infirmity of his wife was
caused by overwork in gathering and boiling sap. Ield, that it was
competent for the plaintiff to show by the same witness, and as part of
the same conversation, that the wife then denied her husband's state.
ment. and declared that she had not gathered and boiled sap : Lindsey
and wicfe v. Danvillc, 45 Vt.
EXECUTION.
QOice r-Receiptor-Dezand and Rfiisa -- A ttacnieant.-It has been
tont settled in this state that an officer is not liable for property attached
by him on mesne process, which has peri-hed without fiult for which he
is liable: Ide v. Fasselt. 45 Yt.
It is equally well settled that a receiptor of sue1; property is not liable
on his receilt. when it has pcri .hed withoit like fault : N.
On the occasion of a demand by the plaintiff, an attaching offiver, of
property receipted by the dlendait. it wa :,rei.d that the dclenilant
should deliver the lJrope rtv to 1le phliiitf at a t lme andl plce ,r sale
to lie appointed by tle pl:inifti . 'Tlhe pl:iltiff did not 1 i;,ke .silh ap.
pointinent. but, without making ally fu rler dciiiall. su ed thIc hcifl ant
on li-k receipt. 11hi, that lie could not recover : .Jt.
The plaintiff attached ten swarnis of bees. and the delendant receipted
them, but no mention was made either in the attachment or the receipt,
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of the hives in which they were. Held, that the defendant was not
liable for the hives under his receipt: Id.
HIGHWAY.
Temporary adoption of Private Way-Liability of Town for Con-
dition of.-A highway was rendered impassable by a freshet. One of
the selectmen, pursuant to a previous understanding among the select-
men that each should take charge of the matters pertaining to the duties
of the office in their respective parts of the town, and that what each
did should be concurred in by the others, placed a barrier across the
highway for the purpose of preventing travellers from passing over it
while thus out of repair, and of turning the travel, for the time being,
and until the highway was repaired, around the founderous portion of
the highway, over a hill road, which was a private way, not adopted by
the town. Held, that this constituted a temporary adoption of the pri-
vate way as a substitute for the highway while not in condition for use,
and that the town thereby became liable for damage occasioned by reason
ef the insufficiency and want of repair of said private way : Dickinson
v. Rockingham, 45 Vt.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Evidence.
Competency of Witness-Right of Administrator of Wife to maintam
Suit (it Law against her Husband-Fraudulent Conveyance-Reduction
of Wife's Choses in Action to Possession by her Husband.-In trover for
certain mortgage notes, brought by the administrator of the wife against
the husband, the plaintiff's testimony tended to prove that the defendant
at some time admitted that said notes belonged to the intestate. Held,
that the defendant was not a competent witness to any matter that oc-
curred prior to the appointment of the administrator: Roberts v. Lund,
45 Vt.
The administrator of the wife can maintain any proper action at law
against the husband for the enforcemefit of her rights of property: Id.
If a husband, to avoid being compelled by the town to contribute to
che support of his pauper mother, conveys land to his wife without con-
sideration, such conveyance is good between the parties; for the law
will not permit a party.to allege his own fraud to avoid his contracts, or
the legal consequences of his own act: Id.
INJUNCTION.
Right of Way-Acquiescence-Laehes.-If the right of way, over a
street, of the owner of a lot fronting thereon, is so unlawfully obstructed
as to subject him to a special injury, not common to, but distinct and
different from that suffered by the public, and for which he cannot
obtain adequate compensation at law, he is entitled to the summary in-
terference of a court of equity by injunction : B. & 0. R. Co. v. Strauss,
37 Md.
If a party fully cognisant of his rights, permits a public corporation
to expend large sums of money in laying down and completing its rail-
road tracks in contravention of his rights, and makes no complaint, and
does not attempt to interfere, or interrupt them during the progress and
construction of the work, he is precluded, by such acquiescence, from
relief by injunction : Id.
The owner of a lot of ground fronting on a public street, suffered a
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railroad company which had constructed one track on said street, to h I
down and complete at considerable expense, two additional tracks
thereon, and made no complaint, and interposed no objection during the
progress and construction of the work, but acquiesced therein. Ten
years after the completion of the two additional tracks, the owner of the
lot filed a bill in equity, asking that the railroad company might be re-
strained from using or maintaining more than two tracks, upon the
ground that the use of the three tracks was an obstruction of his right of
way over said street, and had done, and was doing him an irreparable
injury for which he had no adequate remedy at law. Held, That the
complainant had not used due diligence in making his application, and
was therefore not entitled to an injunction :id.
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Alien Enemy-Liablity of a Person, while ivithin the Confederate
Lines, to be proceeded against by an Order of Publication, granted by
a Court in _ahryland-Presmption of i'oticefrom the due Publication
of the Order of Publication-Purchasers utder an Order of Covrt pro-
tected in their Titles.-While an alien enemy is incapable of suing and
maintaining a suit, either at law or in equity, in the courts of the
country to which he is hostile, during the state of hostilities, he is
liable to be sued, if within the reach of process : Dorsey v. Thomp-
son, 37 Md.
A resident citizen of Maryland, who, after hostilities had commenced
between the United States and the Confederate States, voluntarily left
his home, and went to Virginia, one of the Confederate States, and
afterwards joined the Confederate army, nay be proceeded against by
order of publication, granted by a court in, Maryland, and he is bound
by the proceedings taken in the cause, as any other non-resident defend-
ant would be, notwithstanding that he was at the time within the Con-
federate lines, and could not in fact receive the notice by publica-
tion : I.
The presumption of notice, resulting from the due publication of the
order of court, is such as to confer upon the court power and jurisdic-
tion to decree upon the subject-matter of the suit, that subject-matter
itself being within the jurisdiction of the court: Rd.
Where a court of equity. having jurisdiction, passes an order di-
recting the sale of real estate, the purchasers of such real estate are
entitled to be protected, and a reversal of the order of sale would not
operate to disturb their titles acquired under it : Id.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Notice to quit-Tenaneyfrom year to year-Determination of Ten.
ancy at ivill, or at sqf'erance-Noticc to quit is never necessary, unless
the relation of landlord and tenant exists : Chamberlin v. Donahue,
45 Vt.
If one in possession repudiates the relation of tenant to his landlord,
demand of possession or notice to quit, is not necessary : Id.
An agreement to pay rent by the tenant, is an essential element of a
tenacy from year to year : P.
A tenancy at v ill may always be determined bv any act or declara-
tion inconsistent with the continued voluntary relation of landlord and
benant : Id.
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WThether one be in possession of land under an implied license, or as
tenant at sufferance, or at will, the commencement of an action of eject-
ment against him by the owner, determines his relation, and his posses-
sion thereafter becomes wrongful: Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Note payable in Instalments---oint Note--Promise by one of the
Debtors.-In assumpsit on a note payable in instalments, an action may
be maintained on each as it becomes due; the statute therefore began
to run as soon as such instalment became due: Bush v. Stowell, 71
Penn.
A payment or acknowledgment by one of several joint debtors will
not avoid the bar of the statute as to the others : Id
In an action of assumpsit against four on a joint note payable by in-
stalments, one of which had become due within six years, two pleaded
the statute; and there was an acknowledgment by one as to the whole;
the verdict was for the plaintiff for the whole, "for $692 whereof and
no more two of the defendants D. and A. are liable." On error by the
plaintiff, held, that no injury had been done him, and the judgment on
the verdict was affirmed: Id.
The instruction of the court should have been to find against all the
defendants for the amount of the last instalment: Id.
MUNIOIPAL CORPORATION. See Constitutional Law; Highway.
PARTIES.
To bind the estate of a deceased. party, or to authorize any decree
for an account, against the same, it is not sufficient that the person who
is the representative thereof is a party to the suit. He must be made
a party distinctly in his representative character: Fisher et al. v. Hub-
bell et al, 65 Barb.
Where a defect of parties is apparent on the face of the complaint,
but no demurrer is interposed, and no suggestion of the defect made
until the argument of an appeal from the judgment, neither party is
entitled to costs of the appeal: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.
Use of Name of a Person not a Partner.-If one suffers another to
hold him out as a partner, or to use his name in business as such, he is
liable as a partner on a contract thus made, although in fact he has no
interest in the business of such partnership: Smith v. Hill, 45 Vt.
Hill and Harrington were never partners, and no such firm as Hill &
Co. ever existed; but Harrington gave the plaintiff a note for some staging
property purchased by him, signed " Hill & Co., by Harrington," with-
out the knowledge of Hill. Two or three years before said note was given,
Hill was informed that Harrington was using the name of Hill & Co., in
his staging business, and he afterwards saw Harrington and told him
he must not use that name to injure him, and he said he would not.
The plaintiff did not know of such previous use of that name at the
time said note was given, and it did not appear whether Harrington
made any representations to him at that time. Held, that Hill was liable
on said note: Id.
Held, also, that, inasmuch as the signature to said note disclosed the
name of Hill, it made no difference that the plaintiff did not know of
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the previous use of Hill's name as aforesaid, at the time said note was
executed, for the legal intendment is, that the payee takes a note upon
the faith of the persons whose names appear upon it as makers : Id.
Evidenee.-In a question of partnership, evidence that the connec-
tion between alleged partners had been formed fraudulently and for the
purpose of covering the property of one from his creditors, is not admis-
sible: Thomas v. M-oore, 71 Penn.
B. sold part of a coal-lease with the personal property to M., who
constituted 0. his attorney; orders drawn for goods by B. on a firm,
"B. & Co.," in favor of the plaintiffs, accepted by 0., and goods furnished
accordingly, were evidence of partnership between B. & 31. : 1l.
B. when alone kept blank assignments which were filled up by him
to the plaintiff, a storekeeper, for the amount due laborers of R.. and
the laborers received goods to the amount! from the plaintiff. There
being evidence of partnership between B. and M., such assignments
dated afterwards were evidence in a suit against the firm : Id.
Settlement of Accounts-Assumpsit does not lie between Partners until
Balance struck.-Leidy and Messinger as partners, purchased for 81000
one share of the stock of an unincorporated oil company ; i1essinger
paid $500 in cash, and Leidy gave his note for $500, which was passed
in payment for the purchase-money of the land of the company, placed
by the vendor in the hands of counsel for collection and was unpaid.
The company became insolvent. Held, that Messinger in assumpsit
could not recover from Leidy the one-half of the cash paid by him:
Leidy v. Messinger, 71 Penn.
Leidy's liability to Messinger resulted from the partnership relation,
and Messinger could not recover until there was a settlement of their
accounts and a balance struck : d.
Partnership accounts must be settled in one proceeding; by account
render or bill in equity; until there has been a settlement of partner-
ship accounts, assumpsit will not lie for advances unless there has been
an express promise to repay : Id.
This rule applies whether the property of the partnership had ceased
to exist or not: d.
PLEADING.
Including various Causes of Action in one Count-.Fats not well
pleaded-Demnrrer.-A petition is bad. which classifies and groups to-
gether the principal facts constituting 670 separate and distinct causes
of action, and alleges such facts in general term (670 separate and dis-
tinct facts being stated in one general allegation), in one general heading
to said petition, and does not state the facts constituting each cause of
action in a separate count, but simply refers, in each count, to the facts
as stated in said general heading : Stewart v. Bilderson, 10 Kans.
Such a petition does not nor does any count thereof state facts suffi-
cie,,t, wellpleaded, to constitute a cause of actoion : Id.
A motion asking that the plaintiffs be required to make such petition
Jefinite and certain. by separately stating and numbering their several
.-auos of action, should have been sustained : ,d.
Where such a motion has been made to such a petition, and overruled,
and then a demurrer filed thereto, no facts stated in the petition should
be taken as true on the hearing of the demurrer. unle:s they were so
well pleaded as not to be objectionable on the hearing of said motion : Id.
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After such a motion has been made and overruled, and demurrers
filed to the petition and to each count thereof, on the ground that the
same did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the
demurrers should have been sustained, on the ground that neither the
petition nor any count thereof did state facts sufficient, wellpleaded, to
constitute a cause of action : Id.
RAILROAD.
Responsibility for Injury done by Fire occasioned by its Engines.-
The 1st section of Article 77 of the Code of Public General Laws,
which makes railroad companies responsible for injuries by fire occasioned
by their engines upon any of their roads, applies not only to a case where
a party has suffered damage by fire communicated by sparks flying from
the smokestack, or by sparks, coals or fire dropping from, or flying out
of the furnace or ash-pan of the engine, but also to a case where the
fire was communicated from coals or cinders thrown from the engine by
the servants of the company having charge of it at the time; and if the
party damaged establishes by sufficient proof that the fire thus originated,
and that he suffered damage thereby, the onus is cast upon the company
of proving that such damage was not the result of its negligence or
carelessness, or that of its agents: B. & 0. R. Co. v. Dorsey, 37 DId.
SHERIFF. See Execution.
Irregular Writ- Oficerprotected in execution of-.A libel for materials,
&-., was filed, and a writ of attachment was issued against five boats,
which were attached by the sheriff. Held, if the attachment was ir-
regular because joint, as the court had jurisdiction, it was a protection
to the sheriff: Fall Creek Coal Co. v. Smith, 71 Penn.
It was not for the sheriff to determine anything about the irregularity
of the writ, but he was bound to serve it: Id.
Where a court has jurisdiction of the action, their officers are not re-
sponsible for errors in the process : Id.
It depends upon the action of the party in interest whether irregular
process shall become void: if inherently without efficacy it is void as to
all persons, whether interested or not : Id.
SURETY.
Discharge by failure to sue Debtor-New Promise.-Funk, who was
surety on a note, was discharged by the holder refusing to pursue the
principal upon notice. He afterwards wrote to holder, "Have patience
until about January 3d. I think you will receive your money;" again,
"I was at Esq's for money three times, but did not meet him; I will
pay you as soon as the money is obtained. I will see you yet this
week." Suit had been brought at the date of last note. Held, 1. That
the letters were only a conditional promise to pay on obtaining the
money from the justice. 2. If it had been absolute, the consideration
of forbearance had not been performed: Funk v. Frankenfiod, 71t
Penn.
TOWN. See Highway.
TRESPASS.
When. will not lie for the Asportation and Conversion of Property-
Practice-Burden of Proof.-A verbal agreement to sell and convey,
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for a valuable consideration, all the personal property the vendor then
had, and all that she might thereafter acquire and die possessed of, is
inoperative to pass the legal.title to the subsequently acquired property,
so as to enable the vendee to maintain trepass or trover for its asportatiol.
and conversion : Wilson v. Wilson, 37 .3d.
And in an action by the vendee for the asportation and conversion of
the property embraced in such contract of sale, the burden of proof
rests upon him to show what articles, among those claimed, the vendor
had at the time the contract was made, the defendant conceding his lia-
bility for all articles taken by him as were in the possession of the
vendor at the date of the contract. Without such proof the jury would
have no standard of damages upon which they could base their verdict:
Id.
TROVER.
Conversion- Offset.-The defendant delivered his stage horses to the
plaintiff to be kept at an agreed price. There was no promise on the
part of the plaintiff, express or implied, tolredeliver said horses to the
defendant on demand, other than what might be implied from his agree-
ment to keep them as aforesaid ; but the defendant had a right to take
them at any and all times, to use in his business, and had always done
so until the plaintiff refused to permit him to do so, and detained them
from him. Held, that such refusal and detention was a tort, and a con-
version of the horses, and not the proper subject of a plea in offset:
Hudson v. Nute, 45 Vt.
Conditional Sale-Property by Accession,-H. bought a stage-wagon
of B. upon condition that it should remain B.'s till paid for. The
plaintiff repaired it for H. by supplying new wheels and putting in new
iron axles. H. wrongfully took it from the plaintiff's possession without
paying for repairs. A few days thereafter, the plaintiff took H.'s note
for. the repairs, with an agreement that the "running part" of said wagon
should remain his till said note was paid., 1. never paid B fr the
wagon, but the plaintiff knew nothing of B.'s claim. B., knowing the
wagon had been repaired, but not knowing by whom, took it back from
H. and sold it to the defendant, who knew ngthing of the plaintiff's claim
till long after his purchase. Held, that the plaintiff could maintain
trover for said wheels and axles: Clark v. 11'dls, 45 Vt.
WAY.
Deed-Acts of Parties-Force of.-Fox conveyed a lot to Kraut, witl.
a passage, without defining it, over his " remaining ground" to convey
the filth from Kraut's privy; part of his " remaining ground" was
vacant and part occupied by a house in which Fox lived, he conveyed
the vacant part, with special warranty, to Craig, without any reservation,
and afterwards opened for the purpose through his house a passage,
which Kraut used twice. Fox's heirs were bound by this location and
could be restrained frmn preventing Kraut from using the passage:
Kraitt's Appjwil, 71 
Penn.
Although the co. truction of the grant might lie that tlh, vacant part
was intended for tlh passage. the partics ni..:lht define the limits by sub-
sequent agreement. u e and acquiescence: M(
The presumption was that Fo. intended ),; his deed thla Crait's lot
should be di-.eharged from the easement, and that it should be fixed on
Fox's improved lot: Id.
